We explore the implications of adopting a Taylor-type interest-rate rule in a simple monetary growth model in which budget deficits are financed partly by unbacked government debt. To ensure uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium, monetary policy cannot be either too "active" or too "passive". The effects of fiscal policy depend crucially on whether monetary policy is active or passive, and are independent of the "tightness" of monetary policy.
Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed rapid growth in the literature on monetary policy rules.
There are two important early contributions. Taylor (1993) suggested that US monetary policy can be best understood as an automatic policy rule relating the inflation rate and the output gap to the Federal Funds rate. This helps identify the activeness of a central bank through the estimate of the coefficients of the interest rate rule equation known as the Taylor rule. Leeper (1991) presented a theoretical inquiry into the relationship between the activeness of monetary policy and the uniqueness of equilibrium. Since Leeper (1991) , determinacy of equilibrium has become one of the key criteria of a "good" fiscal-monetary policy.
Since the publication of Taylor (1993) , many researchers have integrated a Taylor-type interestrate rule into a variety of dynamic general equilibrium monetary models to verify or challenge the so-called Taylor principle, according to which, for stability, the central bank must be "active", which means that it raises (cuts) the nominal interest rate by more than one percent if the inflation rate This paper shares the spirit of Benhabib et al. (2001a Benhabib et al. ( , 2001b in exploring the implications of adopting a Taylor-type interest-rate rule. Whereas the majority of the theoretical studies about the Taylor rule focus on the issue of determinacy, i.e., uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium, we focus on the properties of the steady-state equilibrium. In particular, we reconsider the effects of fiscal policy with special attention to the role of the automatic response of monetary policy implied by the Taylor rule.
This inquiry is not confined to academic interests. Since the financial crisis of 2007 and the recession that followed, there has been a resurgence of interest, among economists and policy-makers, in the effects of large-scale debt-financed government spending. 1 Friedman (2006, p. 207 ) dubbed the sizable budget deficits in the US since 2001 "the return of large-scale fiscal irresponsibility".
Only a few years later, what we observe around the globe is a massive increase in debt-financed government spending. Motivated by this observation, we study fiscal policy from the perspective of budget deficits and debt.
However, not all frameworks are appropriate for analyzing the complicated interaction between budget deficits and the real interest rate. According to the "Ricardian view", there should be no effect on the real interest rate, because a debt-financed increase in budget deficits induces the consumer to save more, offsetting the decrease in national saving caused by the deficits. Recent empirical studies (Engen and Hubbard, 2004; Gale and Orszag, 2004; Friedman, 2006; and Laubach, 2009 ) suggested a significant positive relationship between budget deficits and the real interest rate.
This led Gale and Orszag (2004) to conclude, "the Ricardian view is not a good approximation to reality" (2004, p. 103). 2 For the conduct of monetary policy, it is important to understand the way in which the real interest rate is affected by a change in the budget deficit, and by a change in monetary policy in response to a change in inflation that, in turn, results from that change in the budget deficit.
As Bullard and Russell (1999) argued, departure from the world of Ricardian equivalence allows the government and the central bank to influence the real allocation through changes in the real interest rate.
In order to produce a departure from Ricardian equivalence, we adopt a monetary growth model with overlapping generations (OLG). One of the key features of the OLG economy is that BGHS extended Smith (1997, 1998 ) to allow for a fiscal deficit. Although the BGHS model is substantially general, it has two important assumptions that limit the way macroeconomic policy is conducted. One is that the government spending (and the budget deficit) is procyclical in the sense that per capita government spending is proportional to the real wage rate. The other is that the central bank targets the ratio of government bonds and money.
In order to explore the implications for fiscal policy of adopting a Taylor rule, we follow BGHS and take a step further to relax the two assumptions BGHS made. First, we replace their monetary policy rule with a Taylor rule. Second, we introduce both government spending and taxation, and assume that the tax is proportional to the wage rate. This specification is motivated by the 3 Adoption of a balanced budget is known to introduce nontrivial consequences. For the macroeconomic implications of adopting a balanced-budget rule, see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997, 2000) .
procyclical nature of tax revenue. Thus, constant government spending implies countercyclical budget deficits.
The model presented in this paper has money, government bonds, capital, taxation, government spending, and a Taylor rule. 4 Although there are many endogenous variables to be determined, it turns out that the model is quite tractable. However, because the model is highly nonlinear, as in BGHS, we take a diagrammatic approach to characterizing equilibria. 5 To highlight the roles of active and passive monetary policies, in our diagrammatic representation of the model, we isolate the locus that represents the automatic reactions of the central bank, whereas the other locus summarizes the private behaviors, the equilibrium conditions, and the budget constraints for the government and the central bank. 4 To simplify the exposition, we exclude the banking sector from our analysis to focus on the issue of fiscal-monetary policy interaction. 5 Part of the reason for adopting a diagrammatic approach is that we encounter multiple steady-state equilibria.
This requires a global analysis rather than a linearized local system. rate and lower capital and output. Under a passive monetary policy, this translates into a higher nominal interest rate, capital, and output.
When there are two steady-state equilibria, one of them has the same qualitative properties as the unique equilibrium. The other equilibrium has different qualitative properties. In the terminology of public finance, this alternative equilibrium is on the "wrong side" of the Laffer curve, on which the government should reduce inflation to finance an increased amount of deficit.
This is because individuals substitute away from money as inflation goes up, thereby reducing the inflation tax base.
An additional contribution of this paper is that we clarify the relation of the results obtained Monetary policy is said to be "tight" when this ratio is high. We find that this type of policy necessarily implies that monetary policy is passive, and this is independent of how "tight" monetary policy is. In other words, the qualitative implications of fiscal policy are invariant to the tightness of monetary policy.
Second, we reconsider Friedman's (1969) recommendation to target the growth rate of a monetary aggregate. One of the major views against this prescription is that in practice, central bankers adopt an interest-rate rule because it is known to be difficult (or impossible) to perfectly control the stock of a monetary aggregate. 6 Thus, we instead study a policy of targeting the speed of open market purchases. This policy should be much easier to implement in practice. We find that in any steady state, this policy exactly implements the same outcome as does Friedman's constant money growth rule. In addition, this policy is shown to be equivalent, in terms of its steady state implications, to targeting inflation in the strict sense. This implies that targeting the speed of open market operations is necessarily an active monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 charac-terizes the steady state equilibria and presents some comparative statics. Section 4 discusses other monetary policy rules. Section 5 concludes.
Environment
We consider an economy consisting of an infinite sequence of two-period-lived overlapping generations, an initial old generation, and an infinitely-lived government. Let t = 1, 2, ... index time. At each date t, a new generation of a unit measure is born. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young and is retired when old. In addition, the initial old agents are endowed with
There is a single final good produced using the Cobb-Douglas production function
with A ≥ 1 and 0 < α < 1/2, where K t denotes the capital input and N t denotes the labor input. Let k t ≡ K t /N t denote the capital-labor ratio. Then, the intensive production
It is easy to see that f (0) = 0, f 0 > 0 > f 00 , and the Inada conditions hold.
The final good can either be consumed in the period it is produced, or stored to yield capital in the next period. For expositional reasons, capital is assumed to depreciate 100% between periods.
Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, factors of production receive their marginal product. Let r t and w t denote the rental rate of capital and the real wage rate. Each young agent supplies his or her labor endowment inelastically in the labor market. Then, profit maximization
The Government and the Central Bank
Following Azariadis and Lam (2009), we describe separately the budget constraints of the fiscal and monetary authorities. We let G t denote the government spending, T t denote the amount of tax revenue, I t ≥ 1 denote the gross nominal interest rate, and B g t denote the amount of government bonds issued in period t. The fiscal authority's budget constraint is
for t ≥ 2 and
We assume that the government simply consumes G t and that G t does not affect the utility of any generation or the production process at any date. We divide (1) by p t and apply the Fisher equation R t+1 ≡ I t+1 p t /p t+1 to obtain
where g t = G t /p t , τ t = T t /p t , and b g t = B g t /p t . Because bonds and capital are competing financial assets in this economy, the non-arbitrage condition requires the rates of return on these assets to be the same in equilibrium. Thus,
If B m t denotes the monetary authority's demand for government bonds, then the budget constraint for the central bank is
for t ≥ 1, where B m t is the amount of government bonds purchased by the central bank through open market operations. 7 Divide (3) by p t to obtain
where
In what follows, we let Π t ≡ p t /p t−1 .
In this paper, we consider the following policy rules. The fiscal authority chooses the entire path for the real government spending. To simplify the analysis, we assume g t = g for all t. We assume that the tax is set to be proportional to the real wage rate:
where 0 ≤ θ < 1 is an exogenous tax rate.
Following Leeper (1991) , we assume that the central bank follows a Taylor-type (1993) feedback rule: for β > 0, and I * for β = 0, where I * and Π * are the implicit targets for I t and Π t . The level of β is of paramount importance in the analysis. Linearizing (6) yields
Thus, β is the elasticity that captures the degree of aggressiveness of monetary policy. 8 
Households
In order to focus on agents' portfolio choice, we assume that all individuals save all their income.
As a means of saving, agents may hold money and non-monetary assets. In order to motivate the demand for money as a liquid asset, we divide each period into two subperiods. The non-monetary assets, denoted by Z t , are assumed to yield a gross nominal return of I t+1 ≥ 1 in the next period.
However, the non-monetary assets cannot be liquidated until the second subperiod. Money, whose nominal interest rate is zero, is assumed to be the only liquid asset in this economy. Thus, the only distinction between money and non-monetary assets is that non-monetary assets must be held a little longer (Martins, 1980; Kudoh, 2007) .
We assume that each individual wishes to consume in both subperiods. Let c 1t and c 2t denote the consumption of the final good in the first and second subperiods, respectively, by an old agent born in period t. The individual's objective function is φu (c 1t ) liquidate non-monetary assets in the first subperiod, the agent faces a cash-in-advance constraint:
The individual's budget constraint when young is 8 The expression (6) does not have a term that relates the output gap to the nominal interest rate. It is important to note that in our flexible-price economy, the output gap is, by construction, zero (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003) .
Further, according to the estimates of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998), the coefficient on the output gap is quite small for many central banks.
where the consumer takes H t and T t as given. Similarly, the budget constraint when old is
The cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as the (net) nominal interest rate is positive (i.e.,
Thus, a young individual's maximization problem is:
The first-order condition for this problem yields the following money demand function:
It is easy to establish that γ 0 (I) < 0 holds for ρ ∈ (0, 1), lim I→∞ γ(I) = 0 and lim I→0 γ(I) = 1
hold for ρ ∈ (0, 1), and γ(
The value of ρ captures the strength of the income effect of a change in I. Throughout, we focus on the case in which ρ ∈ (0, 1) so that the income effect is relatively weak.
In Smith (1997, 1998) and BGHS, markets are spatially separated, communication across the markets is limited, and their "relocation shock" is similar to the liquidity preference shock of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . In such an environment, financial intermediation arises to provide perfect risk sharing through demand deposit contracts, and the deposit demand function is known to have the same form as (11) . For brevity of exposition, we do not introduce the banking sector. 9 3 Equilibrium
Characterization
A monetary equilibrium is defined by a set of sequences for allocations {m t , b t , k t } and relative prices {R t , Π t }, and initial conditions K 1 > 0, M 0 > 0, and B 0 = 0 such that: each household 9 BGHS studied the reserve requirement the banking sector faces. maximizes utility; the factor markets clear; the asset markets clear; the fiscal authority's budget constraint is satisfied; the monetary authority's budget constraint is satisfied; fiscal policy specifies sequences for g t and τ t ; and monetary policy specifies a sequence for I t .
The equilibrium conditions for the asset markets are as follows. First, dividing (11) by p t yields
which turns out to be the market clearing condition for money. The bond market equilibrium
t , where B t is the bond holdings by the household. In real terms, we have
The capital market equilibrium requires Z t = B t + p t K t+1 . Dividing it by p t yields
We substitute the government budget constraint (2) and the central bank's budget constraint (4) into (14) to obtain the consolidated government budget constraint:
Steady-state Equilibria
Throughout the paper, we focus on the steady-state equilibria, in which all real variables are invariant over time. It is easy to show that the monetary policy rule (6), the Fisher equation, and the arbitrage condition between bonds and capital (R t = f 0 (k t )) reduce to
Similarly, we substitute the market clearing conditions for money (13) and capital (15) into the consolidated government budget constraint (16) to obtain
where µ(I) ≡ 1 − γ(I) + γ(I)/I. Thus, a steady state equilibrium is determined by a solution to the system of equations (17) and (18) . It follows from the properties of the function γ(I) that µ(1) = 1, and for ρ ∈ (0, 1), lim I→0 µ(I) = ∞ and lim I→∞ µ(I) = 1. Thus suggests that the function µ(·) is generally U-shaped. However, because I is the (gross) nominal interest rate, the value of I we study can be limited to a range that is close to one. In addition, we exclude the scenario of a negative nominal interest rate (I < 1) from our analysis.
Proof. Since µ(I) ≡ 1 − γ(I) + γ(I)/I > 0, it is easy to show that
Since we maintain the assumption 0 < ρ < 1, it is evident that Thus, (19) implies that µ 0 (I) < 0 holds for I ∈ [1, 1/(1 − ρ)].
Lemma 1 helps identify the region of I in which the function µ(·) is monotonic and therefore invertible. Throughout this section, we limit our attention to the region I ∈ [1, 1/(1−ρ)]. It follows from the expression (18) that
It is now evident that the steady-state equilibria are completely characterized diagrammatically by the intersections of the two loci defined by (17) and (20) . To proceed, we need to study the shapes of the two loci.
We start with the first locus, (17) . It is easy to obtain
from which it is easy to establish that the (17)-locus is downward sloping under an active monetary policy (β > 1) and is upward sloping under a passive monetary policy (β < 1).
The intuition is as follows. Under an active monetary policy, the central bank reacts strongly to a change in the inflation rate, implying that the nominal interest rate changes more than the inflation rate. Thus, the Fisher equation (R = I/Π) implies that the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate are positively related. Therefore, the nominal interest rate and the stock of capital are negatively related along the (17)-locus under an active monetary policy. Because the nominal interest rate changes less than the inflation rate under a passive monetary policy, the nominal interest rate and the stock of capital are positively related along the (17)-locus.
We now proceed to studying the configuration of the (20)-locus. To do so we first need to study the properties of the function η(k). It is easy to verify that, because α < 1/2, the equation η(k) = 0 has three roots: k = 0 and the roots of Ak α − k − g = 0. In addition, we note that η(0) = 0 and lim k→ η(k) = −∞. From the definition of η(k), it is easy to obtain
It is easy to verify that lim k→0 η 0 (k) = −∞ and lim k→∞ η 0 (k) = −∞. Let k 0 andk 0 (k 0 <k 0 ) denote the two distinct solutions to the numerator of (21). Then, η 0 (k) > 0 holds for k ∈ (k 0 ,k 0 ).
The level of η(k) reaches its minimum at k = k 0 and its maximum at k =k 0 , as shown in Figure   1 . 10 Since we limit our attention to I ∈ [1, 1/(1 − ρ)], this will limit the region of k as well.
it is evident that an increase in g shifts the η(k)-locus downward.
We now study the (20)-locus. It is easy to verify that Ω 0 (k) = η 0 (k)/µ 0 (I) and Ω 00 (k) = η 00 (k)/µ 0 (I). Thus, the configuration of Ω(k) can be deduced from that of η(k). Noticing µ 0 (I) < 0
, it is straightforward to obtain the configuration of Ω(k), which is depicted in 10 Having established the configurations of the two loci, (17) and (20), we are now in the position to find the steady-state equilibria.
Proposition 2 There is a unique steady state equilibrium if k * satisfies k < k * <k, where
If k * satisfies k * < k ork < k * , then there are at most two steady state equilibria.
We construct a proof of proposition 2 in what follows using diagrams. Since we limit our analysis to I ∈ [1, 1/(1−ρ)], we definek and k * to be the solutions to i(k) = 1 and i(k) = 1/(1−ρ), respectively. In particular,k ≡ (αAΠ * /I * 1/β ) 1/(1−α) . Figure 3 depicts a case in which k * satisfies k < k * <k. Since the function i(k) is monotonic for any β ≥ 0, it is evident from the figure that the steady state is uniquely determined. Figure 4 describes a case in which k * satisfies k * < k. For existence of a steady state, it must be the case that k * <k. To see this, consider
Since 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < α < 1/2, it is easy to verify thatk > k * if and only if β > 1. Further, (22) suggests that the case with k * < k arises when monetary policy is sufficiently active. It is important to note that, in this case, the existence of a steady state is not guaranteed. In fact, there may be no steady state equilibrium if g is sufficiently large. Similarly, Figure 5 describes a case in which k * satisfiesk < k * , which occurs when monetary policy is significantly passive.
The Effects of Fiscal Policy
We now consider the effects of fiscal policy. When monetary policy is passive, higher inflation reduces the real interest rate and increases capital and output. In this case, an increase in government spending increases both the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. The overall effect on the real interest rate is negative, so the stock of capital and output increase. In Figure 6 , the economy moves from point A' to point B'.
The effects of fiscal policy when there are two steady state equilibria are more subtle. Let k L and k H (k L < k H ) denote the two distinct steady state equilibria. Then, we establish the following.
Proposition 4
Suppose that monetary policy is active and k * satisfies k * < k. An increase in g increases k and decreases I and Π at k L . It decreases k and increases I and Π at k H .
We first consider the steady state at k H . The effect is depicted by the movement from point A to point B in Figure 7 . An increase in government spending increases the need for revenue. At this steady state, an increase in inflation can raise revenue. Thus, the rate of inflation increases and the central bank reacts strongly by raising the nominal interest rate. Under an active monetary policy, an increase in the nominal interest rate dominates the increase in inflation, so the real interest rate goes up as well. This reduces capital and output. What happens to this steady state exactly corresponds to the case of the unique steady-state equilibrium shown in Figure 6 .
The effect of fiscal policy at k L is shown by the movement from point C to point D in Figure   7 . This steady state is on the "wrong side" of the inflation Laffer curve, in the sense that the rate of inflation is so high that a further increase in the rate of inflation will shrink the inflation tax base and thereby reduce revenue. Thus, at this steady state, an increase in government spending causes the inflation rate to decrease. The central bank will aggressively cut the nominal interest rate, and as a result, the real interest rate will go down, thereby increasing capital and output.
Proposition 5 Suppose that monetary policy is passive and k * satisfiesk < k * . An increase in g increases k, I, and Π at k L . It decreases k, I, and Π at k H .
When monetary policy is passive, the steady state at k L corresponds to the unique steady-state equilibrium described in Figure 6 , and the steady state at k H corresponds to the "wrong side"
of the inflation Laffer curve. Consider the movement from point A' to point B' in Figure 8 . An increase in government spending increases the need for revenue. At k L , the rate of inflation must rise to finance an increased deficit. The central bank react by raising the nominal interest rate slightly, so the real interest rate decreases. As a result, capital and output increase. At the other steady state, the rate of inflation is already high, so the inflation rate must decrease to finance an increased deficit. A passive monetary policy implies that there will not be a large cut in the nominal interest rate, so the real interest rate increases, and capital and output decrease.
Discussion
It is interesting to consider the case in which ρ is small so that µ(I) is increasing. In particular, we assume ρ is significantly small such that ρ/(1 − ρ) < (I − 1)[1 − γ(I)] is satisfied, under which µ 0 (I) > 0 holds. In this case, the substitution effect of a change in the nominal interest rate is so strong that a small reduction in the nominal interest rate increases the demand for money significantly. This case is similar to the economy on the "wrong side" of the Laffer curve, because an increase in inflation reduces the inflation tax base significantly. With such a money demand function, even a significant change in the stock of money cannot influence the nominal interest rate, and this is the classic case of the "liquidity trap" in the old literature.
Interestingly, the effects of fiscal policy are reversed. Figure 9 depicts the effects of an increase in government spending under an active monetary policy. When money demand is elastic, an increase in inflation induces households to substitute money for bonds and capital. Thus, higher inflation reduces the government's revenue. As a result, an increase in government spending causes a decrease in the inflation rate. The central bank reacts strongly by cutting the nominal interest rate, reducing the real interest rate as a result. This will increase capital and output. The effect is described as the movement from point A' to point B'.
If there are two distinct steady-state equilibria, there is another type of steady state, at which the inflation rate is so low that a further decrease in inflation cannot expand the inflation tax base. 
Alternative Methods of Conducting Monetary Policy

Constant Bonds-Money Ratio
In this section, we clarify the relationship between the Taylor rule considered in the preceding sections and other methods of conducting monetary policy. We first discuss the monetary policy studied by Schreft and Smith (1998) and BGHS, which is given by
where λ > 0. A conventional interpretation of this type of monetary policy is that the central bank continuously conducts open market operations to keep the ratio of bonds and money constant.
Monetary policy is said to be "tight" if λ is high, and "loose" if it is low. In practice, this type of policy rule is easier to implement than is the constant money growth rule, because (23) It is easy to verify that (23) implies b t = λm t . Combining this equation and the market clearing conditions for money (13) and capital (15) yields
Thus, the steady-state equilibria are determined by (24) and (20) . It is easy to verify that (24) implies a positive relationship between I and k. Thus, in terms of the relationship between I and k, this type of monetary policy corresponds to a passive monetary policy for any λ > 0. To determine whether this policy is active or not, we need to derive the elasticity of the nominal interest rate with respect to the rate of inflation. 
Constant Growth of Open Market Purchases
In his famous article, Friedman (1968, p. 16) argued that the monetary authority should adopt "the policy of achieving a steady rate of growth in a specified monetary total." However, many of the recent studies appear to have abandoned Friedman's constant money growth rule in their analyses because an interest-rate policy is more practical (Woodford, 2003) .
Motivated by this debate, in this section, we briefly discuss a possible alternative to a constant money growth rule. In particular, we consider the following monetary policy rule.
where σ > 0 is a parameter chosen by the central bank. According to (26), the central bank targets the quantity of government bonds held by the central bank. In particular, the rate of growth of the quantity purchased is held constant. Even if direct control of the stock money is difficult in practice, policy rule (26) should be easy to implement.
Lemma 7
In any steady state, the following three monetary policy rules are equivalent to each other: (i) B m t = σB m t−1 , (ii) M t = σM t−1 , and (iii) Π t = σ.
Proof. In real terms, B m t = σB m t−1 is b m t = (σ/Π t )b m t−1 , and M t = σM t−1 is m t = (σ/Π t )m t−1 .
Thus, at a steady state, each of these equations implies Π = σ. This is equivalent to the steady state of policy (iii). Thus, to prevent multiple equilibria, the speed of open market operations σ must be high enough.
Conclusion
In this paper, we avoided making any comment on the dynamic properties of the model. Stability 
